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FOUR KEY ELEMENTS TO
SUCCESSFUL FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM
Reza Dibadj
I. INTRODUCTION
The most recent crisis on Wall Street presents our nation with an
extraordinary opportunity to begin a conversation about the economic and
social policies that have led to the financial meltdown we have witnessed over
the past few months. In keeping with the timely and crucial theme of the
Hastings Business Law Journal's Symposium, this Article does not chronicle
the crisis, but rather focuses on the lessons it might hold in getting "beyond the
bailout." To mitigate, or perhaps even avoid, future disasters I argue that
policymakers should focus on remedying four pernicious facilitators to
scandal: dissemination of untruthful or misleading financial information, abuse
of regulatory gaps, exploitation of credulous consumers, and the ability to use
corporate size to privatize profits and socialize costs.
Identifying and blocking these facilitators requires a return to first
principles. Conventional discourse-too often polarized and bitter-offers
precious little help. Consider first those who argue that the government should
simply get out of the way and let private markets work their magic. Such a
laissez-faire argument, with its seemingly respectable intellectual roots in the
Chicago' and Virginia 2 schools of law and economics, has been both enticing
and spectacularly successful. Over the past forty years, we have espoused
public policies driven by the notion that we can organize our collective
economic life simply by having government get out of the way and allowing
private actors to bargain among themselves to achieve an efficient outcome.
3
As I have argued in detail well before our current crisis, this "deregulatory"
Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. I thank the editors of the Hastings Business Law
Journal for giving me the opportunity to present the ideas contained in this Article at the Journal's
Symposium, "Beyond the Bailout," in San Francisco, on April 16, 2009.
I. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theoryi of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EC. & MGMT. SC. 3
(1971).
2. See, e.g.. James M. Buchanan. A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 225, 229 (1975).
3. Even this term is misleading. As Cass Sunstein points out:
What "deregulation" really means is a shift from the status quo to a system of different but
emphatically legal regulation, more specifically one of property, tort, and contract rights, in
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approach simply misunderstands economic reality; notably, it does not pay
attention to transaction and enforcement costs, behavioral biases such as greed
and overconfidence, or even equitable distribution of resources.4 Periodic
scandal and collapse ensues.
In reaction to the disappointment with the facile assumptions of
neoclassic laissez-faire economics, its polar opposite has emerged-asking
government to become an active player in the financial markets. Unfortunately
though, this perspective is left wanting as well. Economic history has shown
government has little expertise in trying to allocate resources from the top
down. The omniscient "command-and-control" iiber-regulator who seeks to
override markets simply does not work.5
Neither of these conventional positions will allow us to get "beyond the
bailout." Instead, policymakers must begin by recognizing a threshold issue
that we have regrettably lost sight of: markets need rules. Government's role
is to create the backdrop and regulations to assure free, open markets that
operate in the public interest. Consistent with new research in regulatory
design, the objective of reform is not to override markets, but rather to ensure
fair and open participation in markets.6 As Alfred Kahn observes, "free
markets may demand governmental interventions just as pervasive and quite
possibly more imaginative than direct regulation; but its lesson is that those
interventions should to the greatest extent possible preserve, supplement, and
enhance competition, rather than suppress it." 7 In the words of Ronald Coase,
the Nobel Prize winning economist: "for anything approaching perfect
competition to exist, an intricate system of rules and regulations would
normally be needed." 8

which government does not impose specific public interest obligations but instead sets up initial
entitlements and then permits trades among owners and producers. This is a regulatory s'ystem
as much as any other. . . . The issue is thus not whether to "deregulate," but whether one or
another regulatory system is better than imaginable alternatives.
Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 512-13 (1999) (emphasis added).
4. See REZA DIBADJ, RESCUING REGULATION (2006).

5. Cf John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the
Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, I140 (2000) ("The failure [of Progressive-era agencies]
occurred because the Progressives constructed heroic institutions that, with their broad delegations, longtenured officials, absence of effective constraints on self-interested activity, and impossibly ambitious
regulatory agenda, were doomed to fail.").
6. As Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill summarize in their study of the transformation of regulated
industries, "[u]nder the new paradigm, the regulator plays a far more limited role. Instead of comprehensively
overseeing an industry in order to protect the end-user, its principal function is to maximize competition among
rival providers. in the erpectation that competition will provide all the protection necessary for end-users."
Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV., 1323, 1361 (1998) (emphasis added).
7. Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 325,
353(1990).
8. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 9 (1988). In an often ignored portion of his
landmark article. The Problem ofSocial Cost, Coase suggests that
there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative regulation should not
lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when .. . a
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In the wake of deregulation, consider a wonderfully simple example that
yet another Nobel Laureate, George Akerlof, provides:
If you let your toddler out of her playpen, you need to watch her more
carefully. This wisdom is known by every American parent but has been
systematically ignored in economic deregulation. For example, in the
1980's, savings and loans were given greatly expanded freedoms. But in
misguided zeal for deregulation, regulatory budgets were cut, not raised.
Enterprising individuals found ways to loot to the savings and loan for their
own gain. Taxpayers, as the ultimate guarantors of deposit insurance, were
left holding the bag. . . . Now is the time to remember the lessons of the
playpen: increased scope for action must be accompanied by increased
regulatory oversight.9

Put succinctly in the words of a business journalist: "[m]arkets are a great
way to organize economic activity, but they need adult supervision." 0 This
Article is devoted to exploring four areas where the toddler has wandered, and
how we can introduce some measure of adult supervision.
II. FOUR FACILITATORS
Four phenomena have facilitated our current crisis: (A) the dissemination
of information that is false or misleading; (B) the ability to abuse regulatory
gaps; (C) the willingness to exploit credulous consumers; and (D) the use of
corporate size to privatize profits and socialize losses. Below, I identify each
facilitator and discuss how and why government should block it.
A.

MISLEADING INFORMATION

A very simple, though too often glossed-over, principle animating
securities regulation is that markets must process information into prices for
companies and assets. If information is inaccurate or misleading, then the
entire system breaks down-in the parlance of the computer programmer,
"garbage in, garbage out." In today's environment, we are unfortunately
large number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem
through the market or the firm may be high.
R.H. Coase, The Problem qfSocial Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1, 18 (1960).
9. George Akerlof, quoted in Louis Uchitelle, Looking for Ways to Make Deregulation Keep Its
Promises, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2002, at C12 (emphasis added). As one commentator suggests:
Today, the instinctive distrust of any govemmental action, and the almost religious faith in free
markets, which characterized the deregulatory movement, seem somewhat naive. There is a
growing recognition instead that unregulated markets do not necessarily operate perfectly, that
successful, anticompetitive behavior by firms is in fact more plausible and common than we
perhaps thought, and the social costs of these phenomena are substantial.
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?: Applying the New Antitrust Learning to Foster Competition in
the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGs L.J. 1479, 1500 (1999).
10. David Wessel, A Lesson Froni the Blackout: Free Markets Also Need Rules, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28,
2003, at Al. Perhaps former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker puts it most succinctly: "Markets are
absolutely indispensable . . . But I don't think they are God." Paul Volcker, quoted in Jacob M. Schlesinger,
Did Washington Help Set the Stage for Economic Woe?, WALL ST. J.. Oct. 17, 2002, at Al 2.
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witnessing a confluence of several factors which should give pause to any
careful investor: often nebulous accounting standards, the delegation of creditrating functions to private actors unaccountable to the public, and a sharp
curtailing in the ability to bring private antifraud lawsuits.
First, government could play an active role in setting more muscular
Consider first that the Securities and Exchange
accounting standards.
Commission ("SEC") has delegated accounting standards to a private
organization, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"). Not only
does the FASB present the inherent conflict of using private funding to set
standards to protect the public, but even when it has seemingly acted in the
public interest it has faced political pressure to back down.''
Three examples should illustrate the point. Approximately a decade ago,
in the controversy surrounding the expensing of stock options, "members of
Congress opposed by an overwhelming margin a proposal by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board to require companies to account for stock options
as an expense-until, that is, a series of major financial scandals changes the
political calculus somewhat."' 2 More recently, when faced with a rule
requiring financial firms to value their assets at fair market value:
Marshalling a multimillion-dollar lobbying campaign, these firms persuaded
key members of Congress to pressure the accounting industry to change the
rule in April [2009]....

The rules had required banks, securities firms and insurers to use market
prices to help assign values to mortgage securities and other assets that don't
trade on exchanges-to "mark to market." But when markets went haywire
last fall, financial firms complained that the rules forced them to slash the
value of many assets based on fire-sale prices. That contributed to big losses
that depleted their capital and left several of the nation's largest firms on the
brink of failure[.]
The American Bankers Association, a trade group, acknowledges that it
3
exerted pressure to change the rules.'
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, consider that balance sheet
shenanigans are often a root cause of scandal, as current and past crises have
shown. After all, the Enron fiasco was to a large extent about its off-balance
sheet investment vehicles, and our recent financial bubble was facilitated by
the ability of financial institutions to remove subprime assets from their

11. As one

former SEC Chairman notes:
The Financial Accounting Standards Board-a private organization, supported by corporate
contributions, that sets auditing standards-needs greater ability and freedom to set new and
tougher rules when necessary. Its decisions on new standards can be agonizingly slow. This
important agency must also be free from Congressional pressure, which is often applied when
powerful corporations seek to undermine new accounting rules that might hurt their earnings.
Arthur Levitt, Who Audits the Auditors?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A29.
12. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Mtyth of State Competition in Corporate Law. 55 STAN. L. REV.
679, 744 (2002).
13. Susan Pulliam & Tom McGinty. USA Inc.: Congress Helped Banks Defang Key Rule, WALL ST. J.,
June 3. 2009. at A1.
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balance sheets. As one observer notes:
Some of the biggest and worst surprises of the financial crisis came when
banks suffered large losses from assets that they had not even reported they
owned.... Those rules hinged largely on something called "qualified
special-purpose entities," or Q's for short. If a bank set up a Q so that it
would operate automatically, with others owning the securities it issued, the
bank could get the assets off its own balance sheet.14
Reform should be simple: force financial institutions to report their assets
on their balance sheets, so that investors can make their decisions with full
information. Indeed, the FASB seems headed in this direction with new rules
scheduled for implementation in 2010.' Quite predictably, banks have tried to
delay implementation of the rules.' 6 More importantly, analysts are already
pointing to loopholes in the FASB's rules which harken back to previous failed
attempts to restrict off-balance sheet games.
In all three examples, the pattern is regrettably clear:
The accountants let us down.
That is one of the clear lessons of the financial crisis that drove the
world into a deep recession. We now know the major banks were hiding
dubious assets off their balance sheets and stretching rules if not breaking
them. We know that their capital was woefully inadequate for the risks they
were taking. Efforts are now being made to improve the rules, with some
success.
But banks have persuaded politicians on both sides of the Atlantic that
the real problem came not when their financial inadequacies were obscured
by bad accounting, but when they were revealed as the losses mounted....
Accounting rule makers at FASB and its international equivalent, the

14. Floyd Norris, Accountants Misled Us Into Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at B I.
15. See News Release, Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Issues Statements 166 and 167
Pertaining to Securitizations and Special Purpose Entities (June 12, 2009), available at
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=FASBContentC&pagename=FASB/FASBContentC/NewsPage&ci
d= 1176156240834&pf-true
("The FASB today published Financial Accounting Statements No. 166, Accounting for Transfers of
Financial Assets, and No. 167, Amendments to FASB Interpretation No. 46(R), which change the way entities
account for securitizations and special-purpose entities. The new standards will impact financial institution
balance sheets beginning in 2010.").
16. See, e.g., Susan Pulliam, Banks Try to Stiff-Arn New Rule-Delay Sought in Accounting Change,as
Investor Groups Plot Own Response, WALL ST. J., Jun. 4, 2009, at Cl ("The financial-services industry is
taking steps to delay an accounting rule that would force banks and others to bring some of their off-balancesheet vehicles back onto their books next year, which could force some to raise additional capital.").
17. As one accountant suggests:
FAS 166 and 167 are intended to limit "sale accounting" to situations where a company has
truly surrendered control of the assets in question, and to ensure that companies consolidate the
entities they do control. While these goals are proper, they are also familiar. The last
derecognition and special purpose entity standards, FAS 140 and Financial Interpretation No.
46(R), had the same goals, and the goals weren't met.
Scott Taub, FASB s New Start on an Old Menace to Balance Sheets, 6 COMPLIANCE WK. I (Aug. 2009), at 1.
See also Jennifer Hughes, Beware the Qf/Balance Sheet Return, FIN. TIMES, June 24, 2009, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b03665e4-60d9-lde-aal2-00144feabdcO.htmlnclick-check=I ("But there are
still potential loopholes... We could yet see some interesting new shadowy structures.").
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International Accounting Standards Board, have been lambasted for efforts
to improve transparency by forcing banks to disclose what their dodgy assets
are actually worth, as opposed to what the banks think they should be
worth.'
More needs to be done to reVair accounting, with the SEC the most
The proposed international convergence
appropriate agency to take the lead.
in accounting standards will likely only make things more complicated.2 0
Second, government needs to reform credit rating agencies. To a large
extent, these agencies facilitated our current economic crisis:
The utter failings of our nation's credit rating agencies-you know the drill:
repeatedly slapping triple-A ratings on piles of dubious mortgage
securities-were central to the financial crisis. And anything-goes ratings
from Fitch, Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's have left
investors around the world with trillions in losses.2 '
There are two principal reasons for the dysfunction. First and most
simply, there is a conflict of interest at the heart of the ratings business model;
"banks and other issuers have paid rating agencies to appraise securities-a bit
like a restaurant paying a critic to review its food, and only if the verdict is
Second, "the credit rating system is one of capitalism's
highly favorable.
strangest hybrids: profit-making companies that perform what is essentially a
regulatory role"23rather than perform the function itself, the "[SEC] opted to
created a new category of officially designated rating agencies, and
In effect the
grandfathered the big three-S&P, Moody's, and Fitch.
government outsourced its regulatory function to three for-profit companies."24
Many reforms are possible. Government could provide public ratings,
refuse to provide a quasi-official imprimatur to private rating agencies, or
25
At the very least it
require investors, rather than issuers, pay for ratings.

18. Norris, supra note 14.

19. Cf Taub, supra note 17 ("Everybody knows how important 'tone at the top' is to internal controls,
ethics, and achieving just about any other goal. For U.S. financial reporting, only the Securities and Exchange
Commission can set that tone.").
20. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 14 ("The fights over bank accounting are taking place against the
backdrop of the S.E.C. trying to decide whether and when to move the United States to international
accounting standards, and as the two boards seek to converge on one set of accounting rules.").
2 1. Gretchen Morgenson, When Bond Ratings Get Stale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1I,2009, at BUL.
22. David Segal, Debt-Rating Agencies Avoid Broad Overhaul After Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at

Al. See also Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at MM36 (in structured finance
deals, "the banks pay only if Moody's delivers the desired rating.... If Moody's and a client bank don't see
eye to eye, the bank can either tweak the numbers or try its luck with a competitor like S.&P., a process known
as 'ratings shopping."').
23. Segal, supra note 22.
24. Lowenstein, supra note 22.
25. See. e.g., Michael Lewis & David Einhorn. Op-Ed, How to Repair a Broken Financial World, N.Y.

TIMES. Jan. 4, 2009, at WKIO ("There should be a rule against issuers paying for ratings. Either investors
should pay for them privately or, if public ratings are deemed essential, they should be publicly provided."):
Lowenstein, supra note 22 ("Though some have proposed requiring that agencies with official recognition
charge investors, rather than issuers, a more practical reform may be for the government to stop certifying
agencies altogether.").

Summer 2010

ELEMENTS TO SUCCESSFUL FINANCIAL REFORM

383

could insist on greater oversight and transparency.26 Unfortunately, though,
even modest reforms are unlikely to happen on the theory that
The Big Three [Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's and Fitch
Ratings], by allowing companies and public entities to raise money by
issuing debt, are an essential engine in the country's vast credit factory, and
given the still-fragile condition of the equipment, lawmakers are reluctant to
try anything but basic repairs, patches and a new alarm system.... There is
no talk, for instance, about creating a fee-financed, independent credit rating
27
agency.
As a consequence, "the market for ratings is sure to look uncannily similar to
the one that helped usher in the crisis: three rivals, all of them paid by issuers,
bestriding the market."28 To make matters worse, the credit rating agencies
seem to be making money from rating new securities wrought from the mess
they themselves created. 29
Third, and perhaps most importantly, we need to reinvigorate private
antifraud suits as a deterrent to the dissemination of false and misleading
information. A cursory glance at securities filings indicates that there is more
than enough disclosure of information. However, there are at least two
problems with placing an overwhelming emphasis on disclosure. As Adam
Pritchard has observed, "Congress and the SEC focus almost exclusively on
disclosure because it reinforces the myths of investor autonomy and
sovereignty, a very lucrative myth as far as the financial services sector is
concerned.,, 30 Further, and perhaps less cynically, disclosures are effectively
useless unless there are stronger mechanisms to ensure the truthfulness of the
disclosures. These mechanisms have been watered down over the past several
years. Both federal statutes and federal common law have made it increasingly
difficult to bring private securities antifraud lawsuits against disclosures that
either finesse or obfuscate the truth.
Perhaps it is no coincidence that scandals have mushroomed since the
mid-1990s, when a triad of securities reform statutes began making it
increasingly difficult to bring private antifraud claims. First, in 1995 the
Private Securities Reform Litigation Act ("PSLRA") introduced, "inter alia,
heightened pleading requirements for class actions alleging fraud in the sale of
national securities."3 1 One year later, in 1996, the National Securities Market

26. See Levitt, supra note II ("Credit ratings agencies should show greater accountability. Because they
have quasi-public responsibilities, they should reveal more about how they operate. The S.E.C. should also
assess their impact on the markets and consider requesting new authority to oversee their operations.").
27. Segal, supra note 22.
28. Id.
29. See id. ("Meantime, to the consternation of detractors, the companies are now earning fees from a
new source: re-Remics, an acronym for resecuritization of real estate mortgage investment conduits. . . . [Tlo
some, it seems to be a way for rating agencies to profit from a mess they helped make.").
30. A. C. Pritchard: The SEC at 70: Time For Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1097-98
(2005).
31. Lander v. Hartford Life. 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001). See also A.C. Pritchard, Constitutional
Federalism. Individual Libersy, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U.
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Improvements Acts ("NSMIA") whose "primary purpose ... was to preempt
state 'Blue Sky' laws which required issuers to register many securities with
state authorities prior to marketing in the state."32 Third, the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA") in 1998 made "federal court the
exclusive venue for class actions alleging fraud in the sale of certain covered
securities and by mandating that such class actions be governed exclusively by
federal law." 33 Through heightened pleading standards and the preemption of
more generous state securities laws, Congress has made it increasingly difficult
for private plaintiffs to bring securities actions.34
Federal common law has evolved into a more defendant-friendly posture
as well. Beginning with two landmark cases in 1975-Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores and Cort v. Ash 3-the
United States Supreme Court has
by and large cabined the federal common law of securities fraud. Over the past
five years and in rapid succession, the Court has placed restrictions on
plaintiffs along two principal dimensions. Decisions such as Dura,37 Tellabs,
and Stoneridge39 move in the direction of imposing heightened pleading
requirements on plaintiffs. Moreover, opinions such as Merrill, Lynch 40 and
Credit Suisse4 1 have effectively given broad preemptive effect to the federal
securities regime, to the detriment of state securities and antitrust law,
respectively.
Notwithstanding the strictures placed on private antifraud cases, one
might argue that there are other mechanisms to police fraud. First, there are
private securities regulations, notably promulgated by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA").42 Unfortunately, however, "Wall Street's
self-regulators have missed virtually all of the major securities scandals of the
L.Q. 435, 481-83 (2000).
32. Lander, 251 F.3d 101, at 108. The securities exempted, called "covered securities," are those
nationally listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, or on NASDAQ. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)
(1998). Note, however, that the "NSMIA expressly preserved state authority to bring enforcement actions
with respect to securities transactions." Stefania A. Di Trollio, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxiev
Act: Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1279, 1295 (2004).
33. Lander, 251 F.3d 101, at 108.
34. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate
Federalism 6 (European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
23/2004 and Georgetown University Law Center, Business, Economics & Regulatory Policy Research Paper
No. 606481, 2004) 51, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=60648 I.
35. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
36. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
37. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
38. Tellabs v. Makor Issues and Rights, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
39. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
40. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
41. Credit Suisse Sec. LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
42. FINRA was "[created in July 2007 through the consolidation of [National Association of Securities
Dealers] and the member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration functions of the New York Stock
Exchange.- About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA (last
visited April 3, 2010).
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past two decades-from troubles that brought down Kidder Peabody, to
analysts' conflicts, to favoritism in awarding initial-public-offering shares, to
trading abuses at the NASDAQ Stock Market."43 Recent scandals and crises
are regrettably no exception. Second, and more importantly, one might argue
that public enforcement, not private litigation, must play a central role. Yet
even the latter point is incomplete: not only does enforcement wax and wane
depending on the era,44 but even in an ideal world public enforcement cannot
Private antifraud suits should thus play a
be everywhere at once.
complementary role in deterring companies from disseminating information
that obfuscates or finesses the truth-and punishing them when they do. More
broadly, there needs to be a rethinking of disclosure as a cure-all. A renewed
emphasis on deterring and punishing fraud may do a lot more to deter abuse
than adding even more disclosure to an array of information that even the most
sophisticated investors apparently have trouble absorbing.45
B.

REGULATORY GAPS

A second facilitator that needs to be thwarted is the abuse of regulatory
gaps. There are many examples of actors and products that have "fallen
through the cracks" of regulatory oversight: mortgage brokers, hedge funds,
and derivative instruments such as credit default swaps. The problem cannot
be overestimated. As the Chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC") observes, "[t]he principal enablers of our current
difficulties were institutions that took on enormous risk by exploiting
regulatory gaps between banks and the nonbank shadow financial system, and
by using unregulated over-the-counter derivative contracts to develop volatile
and potentially dangerous products."4 6 The problem is not new, and recent

43. Laurie P. Cohen & Kate Kelly, NYSE Turmoil Poses Question: Can Wall Street Regulate Itself?,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, at A1.
44. For example, for many years the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was seduced by
free market arguments and the notion that abuses would somehow magically correct themselves. As a
consequence, the SEC did not aggressively pursue transgressions perpetrated by corporations and their
advisors. See, e.g.. Mark Maremont & Deborah Solomon, Behind SEC's Failings: Caution. Tight Budget,
'90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at Al.
45. Interestingly, even commentators who suggest moving toward a voluntary disclosure regime for
offerings nonetheless advocate maintaining mandatory antifraud liability. See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Toward
Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 130 (1999) ("A critical adjunct to my
proposal of disclosure choice is that issuers in public offerings would be subject to a mandatory antifraud
standard-namely, Rule lOb-5 liability. Disclosure choice would shift compliance from ex ante line-item
disclosure to ex post liability standards.").
46. Sheila C. Bair, Op-Ed, The Case Against a Super-Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at A29. As
just one example, consider the plea to regulate credit-default swaps. There are now tens of trillions of dollars
in these contracts between big financial firms. An awful lot of the bad stuff that has happened to our financial
system has happened because it was never explained in plain, simple language. Financial innovators were able
to create new products and markets without anyone thinking too much about their broader financial
consequences-and without regulators knowing very much about them at all. It doesn't matter how transparent
financial markets are if no one can understand what's inside them. Until very recently, companies haven't had
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scandals offer important lessons, if we are willing to heed them. Consider, for
example, that regulatory voids enabled the Enron fraud, not to mention the
one perpetrated by the giant commodities broker Refco.48 The motivation for
miscreants to exploit regulatory gaps is obvious. 49 It becomes government's
responsibility to elevate function over form and close them."o
Efforts at reform face the usual headwinds from the business lobbynotably, a recent effort funded by major banks "to counter an expected attempt
to rein in credit-default swaps and other derivatives-the sophisticated and
profitable financial instruments that were intended to limit risk but instead had
helped take the economy to the brink of disaster." 5 The complicating factor
First, there are
here, however, is institutional, along two dimensions.
disagreements over whether Congress has delegated authority to an agency to
regulate.52 Second, even with authority to regulate, debates ensue around how
to allocate jurisdiction among agencies, leading to well-publicized "turf wars"for example, between the SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC"), and between the FDIC and the Comptroller of the
Currency. 54 Perhaps even before embarking on substantive long-term reforms,
to provide even cursory disclosure of credit-default swaps in their financial statements. See, e.g., Lewis &
Einhorn, supra note 25.

47. The so-called Enron loophole, a notorious eleventh-hour addition to the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, gave an exemption to private energy-trading markets, like the one operated by
Enron before its scandalous collapse in 2001. Regulators later accused Enron traders of using this exempt
market to victimize a vast number of utility customers by manipulating electricity prices in California. See
Diana B. Henriques, Commodities: Latest Boom. Plentiful Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at Al.
48. As two financial journalists sum it up:
Unlike Refco's other subsidiaries, the Bermuda-based unit is largely free of government
scrutiny-because the government decided five years ago to forgo regulating derivatives
transactions that occur away from regulated futures exchanges. . . . After fierce lobbying by
financial institutions and their trade groups, Congress in late 2000 passed a bill that made clear
that, in most cases, over-the-counter derivatives weren't subject to regulation.
Deborah Solomon & Michael Schroeder, How Refco Fell Through Regulatory Cracks; Scandal Highlights a
System that Didn t Require Much Oversight of the Firn s Units, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2005, at A4.

49. In the candid words of one article in the business press, "[b]usinessmen, by and large, don't like free
and open markets. From John D. Rockefeller on, they have found markets to be messy, chaotic, and
insufficiently profitable." Alan Murray, Exile on G Street: Bush *sEconomists Playv a Peripheral Role, WALL
ST. J., May 13, 2003, at A4.
50. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Both Sides of the Aisle See More Regulation, and Not Just of Banks, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 14, 2008. at Al5 ("Companies and instruments that currently are not regulated could be brought
under the government's thumb; unregulated derivatives, hedge funds, mortgage brokers and credit-rating
agencies all have been implicated in the current crisis.").
51. Gretchen Morgenson & Don Van Natta Jr., Even in Crisis, Banks Dig in For Battle Against
Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 1, 2009, at Al.
52. See. e.g.. Henriques, supra note 47 ("The courts have also curbed the commission's [CFTC's] reach.
In three cases since 2000, judges have interpreted federal law to severely limit the commission's [CFTC's]

ability to fight fraud involving both over-the-counter markets and specious foreign currency contracts used to
victimize individual investors.").
53. See, e.g.. Kara Scannell, Exchanges Ofer Varying Views as Regulators Discuss Turf WALL ST. J..
Sept. 3. 2009. at C3 ("The two agencies [SEC and CFTC] have different philosophies in regulating markets.").
54. See. eg.. Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, As U.S. Overhauls Banking System. Two Top
Regulators Feud, N.Y. TIMES, June 14. 2009, at Al ("Two of the nation's most powerful bank regulators
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Congress should confirm the authority of our administrative agencies, and at
the same time resolve once and for all the jurisdictional boundaries. A serious
look also needs to be given at the advantages of having a single financial
regulator versus the disadvantage such a reform would present in not having
regulatory power dispersed among different agencies.55 At the very least, there
needs to be better coordination among public officials, such that miscreants are
not able to exploit regulatory gaps.
C.

CREDULOUS CONSUMERS

Another facilitator has been the exploitation of credulous consumers,
upon which an ever-increasing array of financial products and decisions has
been foisted. Along with the drive to deregulate has come a massive and
dramatic shift in economic risk to the shoulders of middle class and working
Americans.56 While the culprits have largely been a shift from defined-benefit
to defined-contribution retirement plans57 and shrinking healthcare insurance,58
the phenomenon is broader:
[D]eregulating industries, shrinking social programs and promoting a freemarket ideal in which everyone must forge his or her own path, free to rise
or fall on merit or luck . . . has come at a large and largely unnoticed price: a

measurable increase in the risks that Americans must bear as they provide
for their families, pay for their houses, save for their retirements and grab for
the good life. A broad array of protections that families once depended on to
shield them from economic turmoil-stable jobs, widely available health
coverage, guaranteed pensions, short unemployment spells, long-lasting
unemployment benefits and well-funded job training programs-have been
scaled back or have vanished altogether... . The bottom line: more risk for
less reward.59

[Comptroller of the Currency and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] were once again at each other's
throats.").
55. See. e.g., Gary DeWaal, America Must Create a Single Financial Regulator, FIN. TIMES. May 19,
2005, at 13 ("[O]nly by amending its [financial] regulatory system and adopting unitary regulation of financial
services can the US ensure it will maintain its supremacy as the home of global financial services
participants.").
56. See, e.g.. Robert A. Moffitt & Peter Gottschalk, Trends in the Transitory Variance ofEarnings in the
United States, 112 EcoN. J. C68 (2002); Sanford M. Jacoby, Are Career Jobs Headed for Extinction, 42 CAL.
MGMT. REv. 123, 140 (1999); Jacob S. Hacker, Call It the Fanilv Risk Factor, N.Y. TIMES. Jan. I1, 2004, at
§4, 15; Jonathan Krim & Geoff Witte, Average-Wage Earners Fall Behind. WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2004, at
Al.
57. In the former, the employee is guaranteed a fixed sum per month during her retirement years;
however, in the latter, the employee is simply given a sum of money to invest with no guarantee of how much
will actually remain by the time retirement rolls around.
58. Even those with insurance must deal with co-payments. out-of-pocket deductibles, coverage limits
and the like.
59. Peter G. Gosselin, If Anierica Is Richer. Why Are Its Families So Much Less Secure?, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 10. 2004, at Al (emphasis added). See also Peter G. Gosselin. The New Deal: The Poor Have More
Things Toda-Including Wild Income Swings, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at Al; Peter G. Gosselin,
Corporate America Pulling Back Pension Safety Net. L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at Al: Dale Russakoff,
Retirement s Unraveling Safety Net, WASH. POST, May I 5, 2005. at A I.
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Like it or not, almost every working adult is now an investor. Yet too
many consumers are making risky life-changing decisions without having
sufficient knowledge of financial basics such as the time value of money or the
implications of credit. We thus need to place new emphasis on financial
education, perhaps beginning as early as elementary or middle school. Suffice
it to say that enticing advertisements from self-interested financial
intermediaries-urging you to entrust them with your money, so that you too
could be the happy couple strolling down the beach in the advertisement-do
not count.
To be sure, thoughtful commentators have expressed justifiable concern
that citizens have become disengaged from public discourse.60 But the relative
weight the polity has spent discussing economic issues is particularly
troubling. Note, for instance, how much time we have spent considering social
issues-abortion, guns, gay marriage, to name just a few. By contrast, observe
how stunningly little time we have spent discussing economic issues that affect
our everyday livelihood. Granted, economic topics are often not as glamorous
as social ones; after all, one might argue, we all have better things to do with
our time than worry about esoteric things like collateralized debt obligations
and credit default swaps. Perhaps, but a lack of education on economic and
financial issues is at least partially to blame. Most immediately, with more
knowledge consumers would be less credulous and less willing to purchase the
often shoddy financial products peddled at them. Longer term, an informed
citizenry could enter a conversation about the assumptions that have
transformed economic life in America over the past half century. 6'
D.

USING SIZE TO PRIVATIZE PROFITS AND SOCIALIZE LOSSES

In addition to the dissemination of misleading information, abuse of
regulatory gaps, and exploitation of credulous consumers, there is one
additional crucial facilitator: the ability to use corporate size to privatize profits
and socialize costs. With the creation of corporate behemoths via mergers and
acquisitions, industries have become increasingly concentrated and
oligopolistic.62 Despite the usual eloquent assurances from companies that
mergers will unlock "synergies" or reduce costs and thus provide greater value
to consumers, these deals are too often consummated to benefit corporate
insiders-even shareholder interests are frequently secondary. Sadly enough,
60. See. e.g.. EZRA SULEIMAN, DISMANTLING DEMOCRATIC STATES 314 (2003) ("The citizen has been
encouraged to view himself as a client purchasing the government's services. What incentives does such a
perception provide for participation in associational life?").
61. Cf STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 3 (2005) ("liberty means not only freedom from government
coercion but also the freedom to participate in the government itself").
62. See. e.g., Reza Dibadj, Deregulation: A Tragedy in Three Acts, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2003. at A21
[hereinafter Dibadj, Deregulation].
63. See, e.g., Robert Eccles et al., Are You Paying Too Much for that Acquisition?. HARV. BUS. REV.,
July-Aug. 1999, at 136 ("Despite 30 years of evidence demonstrating that most acquisitions don't create value
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one is hard-pressed to find cases where industry concentration has actually
helped consumers: it is no coincidence that consumer advocates tend to oppose
mergers. 64
Yet, antitrust policy over the past forty years has stood idly by and
condoned the creation of large corporate behemoths in industries as diverse as
financial services, airlines, telecommunications, and computer hardware and
software.6 5 A recent and leading antitrust monograph even declares that the
"very ubiquity of merger-created efficiencies is why we evaluate mergers
under a fairly benign set of rules."66 There is no discussion, however, of what
these "efficiencies" are and whether they will be passed onto consumers. What
permits such a logical leap? Regrettably, antitrust has been seduced by the
Chicago School, which in a rhetorical masterstroke, managed to redefine
"consumer welfare" as "allocative efficiency."6 Careful to sidestep over ever
having to measure "efficiency," these theorists posit that if a company's
activities are good for the company, then they should be good for the economy
and consumers as well.
Predictably enough, the result has been shriveled
antitrust policy that too often condones mergers on the theory that large
concentrated industries are somehow a positive social good. 69 Far from the
putative consumer-friendly cost savings and shareholder-friendly synergies
promised, large mergers have too often punished citizens as both consumers
and shareholders.
In times of crisis, however, citizens also suffer a third way: as taxpayers.
Large companies become so gargantuan that they become "too-big-to-fail"
("TBTF")-a brilliant way to internalize profits when things go well, and
externalize costs when they do not. When the putative synergies of expensive
acquisitions do not pan out, macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, or scandals
for the acquiring company's shareholders, executives continue to make more deals, and bigger deals, every
year."); Andrew Ross Sorkin, With a Recovering Economy. The Day ofthe Big Deal is Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2004 at Al ("Of course, business history is littered with failed mergers, and academic studies have long
suggested that fewer than half of all deals work. Some experts argue that the current confidence in the
boardroom may be misplaced."); Michael Arndt, Let's Talk Turkeys, Bus. Wk., Dec. I1, 2000, at 44 ("All too
often nowadays, corporate boards seem eager to rubber-stamp deals negotiated by empire-building CEOs.").
64. See, e.g., Deregulated: Airlines. Banking, Electricity. Telephones. Cable TV, CONSUMER REP., July
2002, at 30.
65. See, e.g., Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Fausttan
Pact of La, and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1528 (1984); Gary Minda, Antitrust at Centurves End, 48
S.M.U. L. REV. 1749, 1769 (1995).
66. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 219(2006).

67. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Does Antitrust Have a Comparative Advantage?. 23 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 5. 6 (1999) [hereinafter Easterbook, Comparative Advantage] ("Modem antitrust law is thus a
search for economic explanations of problematic conduct. If the explanations show the conduct efficient-and
therefore ultimately to consumers benefit-then the court stays its hand; if not, the court condemns the
conduct.") (emphasis added).
68. Robert Bork, for instance. believes that the "closer the members of the industry come to maximizing
their profits. the closer they come to maximizing the welfare of consumers." ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 97 (1978).

69. See, eg. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 2 (2d ed. 2001) (the "small businessman usually is
helped rather than hurt by monopoly.").
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grow out of control, taxpayers come to the rescue. With respect to our current
crisis, consider that financial actors were chasing higher returns in areas such
as subprime lending and the trading of esoteric financial instruments-to
belabor the obvious, any profits made from these activities would belong to
them. All this might be fine as far as it goes, provided of course that the
financial actors also suffer any losses they may incur from their risky
escapades. Yet instead, when things have gone wrong, these seemingly
sophisticated actors instead turn to the federal government for a handout to bail
out their escapades, on the theory that they are simply TBTF.
The culminating affront here, of course, is that it is the individual-the
ordinary taxpayer who might have already suffered mightily as shareholder
and consumer-who is asked to be the insurer of last resort. As such, there is
cause for bitterness:
If a failing firm is deemed "too big" for that honor, then
it should be explicitly nationalized, both to limit its effect on
Its
other firms and to protect the guts of the system.
shareholders should be wiped out, and its management
replaced. Its valuable parts should be sold off as functioning
businesses to the highest bidders-perhaps to some bank that
was not swept up in the credit bubble. The rest should be
liquidated, in calm markets. Do this and, for everyone except
the firms that invented the mess, the pain will likely subside.
Yet rather than contemplate such a course of action, we seem unwilling to
heed warnings and learn from history. In 2004, two Federal Reserve officials
argued that the TBTF scenario would apply to several banks: their collapse
would so harm the overall economy that government would have no choice but
to bail them out.7 1 Even though they seem small by the size of today's
interventions, in the 1980s taxpayers were asked to avenge the savings and
loan industry's death through a $150 billion bailout,72 and in the 1990s the
Federal Reserve marshaled financial institutions to provide nearly $4 billion to
73
Frequent
bailout the investment fund Long-Term Capital Management.
requests from automobile manufacturers and airlines are also par for the
course.
Above all, TBTF facilitates hypocrisy: extol the virtues of free markets
and private 7rofits, then conveniently come begging to Washington to socialize
Lax antitrust has thus indirectly brought with it a peculiar
the losses.
70. Lewis & Einhom, supra note 25.
71. See Gary H. Stern & Ron Feldman, Big Banks,. Big Bailouts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, at A14.
72. See, e.g., Bob Keefe, Some Not Ready to Toss Lifelines to All Those Ailing, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Oct. 5, 2001, at A8.
73. See. e.g., Peter Coy, How the Game Was Played-And Why Long-Term Lost, BUS. WK., Oct. 12,
1998, at 40.
74. Legal critics Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch point to the stunning inconsistency:
[Cjonventional free-market ideology extols the virtues of private capital accumulation.
entrepreneurial skill, and the harsh reality of risk. Yet tax breaks are granted to entice industries
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absurdity: the public as benefactor of last resort, as already-suffering taxpayers
reallocating resources precisely to those corporations who were imprudent in
the first place. To add insult to injury, taxpayers are unwittingly funding the
next round of consolidation-to the extent bailout money is used for mergers
and acquisitions, the actors in the next crisis will be even bigger and more
destabilizing. If the educational program advocated above gains traction,
hopefully more people will ask how this has come about and whether it is
inevitable.
Perhaps citizens should begin by asking why antitrust law-once
heralded by the United States Supreme Court as "the Magna Carta of free
enterprise . . . as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our

free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms" 75-has descended into impotence? After all,
the current ethos has lost sight of the fact that the antitrust "was premised upon
a political judgment that decentralized power was essential to a free society.",7
As Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan sum up:
[A]ntitrust traditionally had two central concerns. The first was politicaldistrust of bigness and of fewness of competitors as well as a policy
preference for diversity and opportunity for the unestablished. The second
was socioeconomic, especially as seen from the vantage point of the small
businessperson and the consumer. Antitrust set fair rules for the competitive
game. What mattered was getting a fair shot as an entrepreneur, and having
choice and receiving a fair deal as a consumer. Antitrust was not a tool for
increasing aggregate national wealth (sometimes called or equated with
allocative efficiency).
The current fashion in antitrust has been simply to ignore these concerns, but it
is time to reconsider whether antitrust should be so demure.
Citizens should also ask whether the confluence of lax antitrust and
deregulation has provided cover for the TBTF syndrome. Years ago, in a short
op-ed piece, I argued that lax antitrust and deregulation have combined to
create a tragedy in three "acts." 78 In the first act, new deregulatory laws are
introduced with much fanfare. In the second, mergers and acquisitions
Finally, in the third act, the
facilitate the development of oligopolies.
oligopolists descend into financial trouble, with taxpayers providing a bailout.
Writing in 2003, I could mention airlines, savings and loan associations, and
the like.

to invest or remain in localities. Cities compete for the opportunity to provide sports teams with
ever more luxurious stadiums. Huge companies get government help when they face financial
ruin. Private companies rarelY turn down the opporitnity to feed greedil' at the public trough.
Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch. The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BuFF. L.
REv. 237, 248-49 (1987).
75. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
76. Minda, supra note 67, at 1755.
77. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan. Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We
Coming From?" Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 944 (1987).
78. See Dibadj, Deregulation, supra note 62.
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Today, we can add banks to the list. First, advocates of deregulation
obtained by 1999 the formal repeal of the Glass-Steagall act, which had
separated commercial from investment banking-successfully arguing that
antitrust laws would forbid mergers unfriendly to consumers. The following
decade witnessed an explosion of bank mergers and acquisitions, followed by
After all, faced with
Who is to blame?
our current bailout woes.
deregulation's shortcomings, the deregulators can conveniently shift the blame
to lax antitrust enforcement-like the child's game of "hot potato."79 As such,
the unfortunate bifurcation between antitrust and regulation has allowed
policymakers enamored of simplistic deregulation to assuage critics by
If antitrust is
sloughing off responsibility to antitrust enforcement.o
considered to be part of regulation, it becomes more difficult for regulatory
pundits to pass the buck when things go awry. Responsibility just might breed
reform.
Ill. CONCLUSION
After consideration of the four facilitators, it might be worth considering
the political economy of financial reform. Some might consider my proposals
After all, special interests benefit from imperfect
hopelessly naive.
information, regulatory gaps, consumer ignorance, and lax antitrust-and it is
in their interest to maintain the status quo. Such an argument has powerful
roots in public choice theory, ' whose ideas can be traced backed to Madison's
account of how "factions" can organize to push their own agenda to the
detriment of society at large. 82 As Mancur Olson noted in his classic book,
The Logic of Collective Action,
The smaller groups-the privileged and intermediate groups-can often
defeat the large groups-the latent groups-which are normally supposed to

79. As the father of airline deregulation, Alfred Kahn, notes with humility:
This kind of defense of the deregulation record-"It wasn't my fault, the trouble is you other
people didn't do your job"-is a trifle glib. It contains more than a trace of justifying the
abandonment of direct regulation, because of its severe imperfections, in terms that implicitly
demand perfection of performance by such agencies as the Department of Transportation, the
Savings and Loan Bank Board and Congress-higher levels of prescience, conscientiousness,
information, incorruptibility or simple effectiveness than can reasonably be expected.
To some extent, similarly, thrusting upon the antitrust authorities both blame for some of the
monopolistic consequences of airline deregulation and responsibility for their future remedy
implicitly more of competition-preserving policies than they can deliver.
Kahn, supra note 7, at 350-51.
80. See Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust. 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745 (2004).
81. See, e.g.,

DANIEL A. FARBER &

PHILIP P. FRICKEY,

LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL

INTRODUCTION 44 (1991) (in "public choice, government is merely a mechanism for combining private
preferences into a social decision.").
82. Madison defines factions as a "number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion . . . adverse to the rights of other
citizens. or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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prevail in democracy. The privileged and intermediate groups often triumph
over the numerically superior forces in the latent or large groups because the
.fbrmer are generally organized and active while the latter are normally
unorganized and inactive.

As a consequence, the "multitude of workers, consumers, white-collar
workers, farmers, and so on are organized only in special circumstances, but
business interests are organized as a general rule."
As commentators have
observed in subsequent years, "[p]rivate entities have successfully lobbied
Congress for public resources to subsidize their own financial activities....
Such governmental subsidization reflects the organizational advantages of the
few who can benefit at the expense of the less well-organized public."8 5
Recognizing this point, however, is perhaps the most crucial step in
blocking the facilitators to scandal. After all, if the broader polity can agree on
goals-policing fraud, closing regulatory gaps, educating consumers,
enforcing our antitrust laws-then we can at last shift debate toward how to
sidestep the special interests and make reforms a reality.
There are at least two categories of approaches worth considering. First,
there is campaign finance reform. As Steven Croley correctly points out in his
critique of public choice, if "the relationship between legislators and
regulation-seeking interest groups constitutes the real lynchpin of the public
choice theory-then reforms in the area of campaign finance, for one example,
might go far to alleviate the problems that lead public choice theorists to call
for deregulation." 86 Or, as Amitai Etzioni asks, "[c]an campaign financing be
thoroughly reformed, not by our current method of merely closing one
floodgate as money gushes over and around the dam and everywhere else, but
in a way that will stop the drift toward a plutocracy of one dollar, one vote?"8 7
A second and complementary approach would be to place greater
emphasis on regulatory agencies as policymakers. In their discussion of "why
sophisticated voters might prefer the delegation of policymaking discretion to
unelected experts," 8 8 David Spence and Frank Cross point to "the lobbying
behavior of the special interest groups. These interest groups do not generally
83. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS

128 (1971) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 143. As Olson further observes:
The number and power of the lobbying organizations representing American business is indeed
surprising in a democracy operating according to the majority rule. . . . The high degree of
organization of business interests, and the power of these business interests, must be due in large
part to the fact that the business community is divided into a series of (generally oligopolistic)
"industries," each of which contains only a fairly small number of firms.
Id. at 142-43.
85. Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental Disposition of Assets: Fashioning
Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1703, 1708 (1999).
86. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process. 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 50-51 (1998).
87. AMITAi ETZIONi, THE ROAD To THE GOOD SOCIETY xi (2001).
88. David B. Spence and Frank Cross. A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J.

97, 100 (2000).
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rush to Congress and say please, 'Regulate us!'89 As Spence argues in a later
article, "[t]he ability to influence legislators' reelection prospects through
campaign contributions, issue advertising, and the like, offer well-heeled
interest groups much greater leverage over legislators than over agency
bureaucrats.,,0 Similarly, Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill remark that
The public choice perspective is also vulnerable insofar as its central
premise-that positive regulation is always inferior to market ordering-is
usually advanced as an article of faith rather than by empirical
demonstration. The history of the great transformation that we have
recounted-in which regulatory agencies often led the charge for regulatory
reform-should by itself be enough to give pause before one asserts any
invariant hypothesis about the behavior of regulators. Contrary to the theory
popular in the late 1960s and early 1970s, agencies do not always behave as
the hopeless captives of their client industries.9 '
In sum, as Croley puts it, public choice theory "rests on a seriously incomplete
and under-theorized understanding of regulatory government, and furthermore
that its empirical predictions are not supported by careful consideration of the
92
evidence about how regulatory agencies operate or what they do."
Perhaps most importantly, repeatedly our society has turned to
administrative agencies to help get it out of serious trouble. Note how history
repeats itself:
Americans have repeatedly turned to federal regulatory government in times
of crisis to address the country's most stubborn problems-from the banking
crises and business corruption of the early twentieth century, through the
Great Depression, stock market crisis, and labor unrest of the 1930s and
1940s, through the environmental crisis and civil rights revolutions of the
1960s and 1970s, to the threat of terrorism and the creation of the huge
Department of Homeland Security at the beginning of the twenty-first
century, to name a few.93
It is of course no coincidence that federal agencies are front-and-center in the
discussion of how to rescue the economy from our recent financial crisis.94
Given this reality, as John Kenneth Galbraith observes, the "massive
ideological attack [that] has been mounted on public regulation in and of the
economy" is "an escape from thought."95 And in his detailed study of the
89. Id. at 122.
90. David B. Spence, Getting Beyond Cvnicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State: A Public Choice
Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 438 (2002).
91. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 6, at 1406.
92. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY

GOVERNMENT 3 (2008). See also Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1355
(2003) (demonstrating the shoddiness of the "empirical foundation for the anti-regulatory fervor that has
gripped Congress, academia, and millions of Americans for over a decade."). Cf Suleiman, supra note 60, at
7 ("the maintenance ofa democratic order... requires a trained, nonvenal bureaucratic machine.").
93. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS, supra note 92, at 3. For a similar argument, see Reza

Dibadj, Government Is Bad, Isn't it?, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 8, 2005. at B9.
94. See, e.g., James R. Hagerty, FHA [Federal Housing Administration], Relic of Past. Is Rebounding,
WALL. ST. J., Mar. 6, 2008. at A4.
95. JoHN KENNETH GALBRAITH. THE GOOD SOCIETY: THE HUMANE AGENDA 76 (1996).
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demise of public administration, Ezra Suleiman concludes that "the attacks on
the federal government, whether with a hammer or with a velvet glove,
achieved none of the grandiose goals of reducing alienation, creating a sense of
community, increasing participation, or increasing trust in government." 96
Society should instead redirect its efforts toward improving the administrative
state, to "create a regulatory superstructure that encourages the betterment of
regulatory technology itself ... for it is nothing less than the aspiration that
government, like all things human, can improve." 97
In the end, we should aspire to free and open markets, but not fall prey to
the idealization that they happen by accident. 98 At its core, blocking the
facilitators is about government takes steps to ensure the rules of the game are
fair. As the banker and diplomat Felix Rohatyn puts it:
I had always believed that this country's basic goals consisted of the primacy
of freedom, the objective of fairness and the creation of wealth. This
concept seemed to hold until the '80s, when greed overcame fairness and the
creation of wealth became an individual fever that knew no limits. Our
present situation calls for a rethinking of many of our economic and social
assumptions, especially the notion that there is but a minor role appropriate
for the government in our economy.... I am also a capitalist and believe
that market capitalism is the best economic system ever invented; but it must
be fair, it must be regulated, and it must be ethical. The last few years have

shown that excesses can come about when finance capitalism and modern
technology are abused in the service of naked greed. Only capitalists can kill
capitalism but our system cannot stand much more abuse of the type we have
witnessed recently, nor can it stand much more of the financial and social
polarization we are seeing today.99
The facilitators I have discussed have helped create the mess Rohatyn
describes. Government should block them. Nothing less than capitalism's
integrity is at stake.' 00

96. Suleiman, supra note 60. at 309-10.
97. Duffy, supra note 5 at 1080.
98. As Frederic Jameson observes, "to get it right, you have to talk about real markets just as much as
about metaphysics, psychology. advertising, culture, representations, and libidinal apparatuses." FREDERIC L.
JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM 264 (1991).
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